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CHAPTER 4
The Sovereignty of the World: Towards 
a Political Theology of Modernity (After 
Blumenberg)
Joseph Albernaz and Kirill Chepurin
“Acute eschatology is the equivalent of the obsessional neurosis whose uni-
versal effect Freud described with the phrase, ‘at last the whole world lies 
under an embargo of impossibility,’” writes Blumenberg in The Legitimacy 
of the Modern Age (LMA, 67–8). To place the (modern) world under an 
embargo of impossibility is, for Blumenberg, to question its legitimacy and 
the very logic of possibility inherent to it. That is, however, exactly the tra-
jectory that our chapter seeks to open up from within Blumenberg’s text. As 
critical theory across disparate subfields seeks to challenge anew the modern 
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world’s underlying logics as, constitutively, a world of domination and 
exclusion, genealogical investigations of modernity—confined earlier to 
Ideengeschichte—gain a new urgency. Many of these logics, as contemporary 
political theology shows, also mark modernity as co-imbricated with 
Christianity and its theopolitical apparatus.1 To trace the genesis of these 
logics is to trace the genesis of the modern world—of how it has been struc-
tured and how it continues to structure its subjects. We see the ongoing 
resurgence of interest in Blumenberg as tied to this tendency. However, 
despite this resurgence, Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age still 
remains to be re-read and re-configured through the lens of contemporary 
theoretical problematics. This chapter is, for us, a first step towards such a 
re-configuration. There is much to be learned from Blumenberg about the 
underlying logics of domination in modernity, often despite his own interest 
in legitimating the modern world. This goes, among other things, for 
Blumenberg’s analysis of the entanglement of modernity with Christianity 
and the ideas of immanence, transcendence and sovereignty that emerge 
out of that entanglement—or out of the modern world’s (and Blumenberg’s 
own) attempt to break away from it.
From the political-theological perspective, turning to Blumenberg is 
important, insofar as it can help us think the co-imbrication of Christian 
and modern logics while still attending to key differences between them—
a point that sometimes gets lost in all-too-quick identifications of moder-
nity with Christianity or in postulating too smooth a continuity between 
them, as in standard theories of immanentization or secularization. At the 
same time, the point is not to mount a secularist defence of modernity, but 
to think, with and against Blumenberg, both what is shared between 
Christianity and modernity and, in a more nuanced way, what changes in 
the transition between the two. In particular, as we shall see, modernity’s 
form of investment in the world—its identification of the world with the 
totality of what is possible and producible—at once inherits and trans-
forms the Christian form of worldly investment, generating new logics of 
futurity, immanence and transcendence, as well as a new world: a world of 
endless productivity, alienation, work, globalization, exploitation and 
racialization, a world recognizable as characteristically modern.
For Blumenberg, while in late-medieval nominalism the inexhaustible 
totality of possibility was identified with God, the move of modernity is to 
identify this totality with the world, in relation to which the modern 
1 For a general mapping of this problematic, see Kirill Chepurin and Alex Dubilet, 
“Immanence, Genealogy, Delegitimation: German Idealism and Political Theology,” in 
Nothing Absolute: German Idealism and the Question of Political Theology, ed. Kirill Chepurin 
and Alex Dubilet (New York: Fordham University Press, 2021).
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subject asserts itself. We will argue that Blumenberg’s logic of the self- 
assertion of the subject involves the actualization of possibilities inherent 
in the world, a framework in which the world itself (re)occupies a position 
that is constitutively transcendent, even though Blumenberg frames 
modernity as an overcoming of transcendence via the immanence of 
“human self-assertion”. Modernity, we contend, reoccupies the sover-
eignty of God with that of the world. The logic of possibility and actualiza-
tion that makes the modern world possible functions, furthermore, as the 
logic of legitimation, in which the subject, the world and the modern age 
itself find their new justification, and through which they overcome the 
perceived Gnostic threat: the threat of the illegitimacy, even the downfall, 
of the world. Blumenbergian sovereignty thus converges with the 
Schmittian, so that the two may be seen as working jointly to establish and 
uphold a (transcendent) order—the order of the world.
OvercOming gnOsticism, investing in the WOrld
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age makes a powerful case for the autonomy 
of modernity with regard to the preceding Christian epoch—but it also 
emphasizes at least one continuity between the two, which can be framed 
via what Blumenberg casts as their common enemy: Gnosticism. Indeed, 
for such a painstaking work, Blumenberg’s most succinct and program-
matic definition of modernity in the book is rather idiosyncratic, even 
cryptic: “The modern age is the second overcoming of Gnosticism” 
(LMA, 126). The Christian age is the first (and ultimately failed) attempt 
at such an overcoming. Far from being external, this opposition to 
Gnosticism structurally defines both epochs as these epochs’ shared task, 
thereby creating an antagonistic continuity between Christianity and 
modernity. What is at stake in this shared opposition?
It is, to put it simply, the Gnostic refusal of investment in the world that 
both  Christianity and modernity oppose. This refusal is, in fact, what 
“Gnosticism” for Blumenberg indexes—coupled with the idea of God 
(and, accordingly, salvation) as absolutely alien to the world and irrecon-
cilable with it. In this sense, Gnosticism operates as a generic and transh-
istorical term beyond its initial function as an umbrella concept for early 
Christian-adjacent heresies that variously conceive the creator of the world 
(known as the demiurge) as malevolent and, by extension, the world as 
illegitimate. Instead, Gnosticism names an operation of the refusal of the 
world, in which all guarantee and purposefulness of this world’s reality, 
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and all sense of this world as worthy of being upheld and invested in, 
disappears.2
This operation is at work already in the Jewish apocalypticism that early 
Christianity sought to overcome. The apocalyptic demands the immediate 
end of the world, refusing investment in the world’s continued existence. 
This end is immediate in the sense of not being mediated by the world and 
not going through it; there is no work of or in the world—no work of his-
tory—to be done before this end can arrive. The end is, instead, immi-
nent, demanded right now. This means, however, that the world as such is 
stripped of all investment and legitimacy—as is worldly power. But as 
Christianity found itself needing to explain the world’s continued exis-
tence, it was also establishing itself just as such a power. As a result, it 
needed to justify not the end of the world, but its prolongation. Therefore, 
already in its early eschatological overcoming of Jewish apocalypticism, 
and then in its opposition to Gnosticism, as Blumenberg shows in a chap-
ter with the telling title “Instead of Secularization of Eschatology, 
Secularization by Eschatology”, Christianity makes the move of postpon-
ing the end of the world and salvation—making room for and justifying 
the world in its not-yetness, between creation and redemption.3 The very 
concept of “world” names this continued justification of the state of 
things, the structural not-yet: “What the term ‘world’ signifies itself origi-
nated in that process of ‘reoccupying’ the position of acute expectation of 
the end” (LMA, 47). The world becomes the work of redemption in a 
constitutively deferred eschatological horizon.
In this, a kind of “secularization” occurs—an investment in and stabili-
zation of the world, allowing for a separate age to emerge and to hold its 
ground (even if its theological status remains merely preliminary or transi-
tive), and thus, among other things, for the establishment of the Christian 
Church as the institution of the not-yet that is the world—as the institu-
tion “stabilizing” this not-yet (LMA, 44). As it continues to oppose 
Gnosticism in its various guises, Christianity goes on to further strengthen 
its investment in the world. The first overcoming of Gnosticism consists 
precisely in this: in the suppression of the Gnostic heresy and the establish-
ment both of the worldly authority of the Church and its ontological, 
2 For the Gnostic, “the world deserved destruction” (LMA, 131).
3 It is not coincidental that Gnosticism “disputed the [Christian] combination of creation 
and redemption” (LMA, 129), since Christianity justified the world precisely as what takes 
place between the two.
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theological and cosmological paradigms. This overcoming, however, 
comes at a fateful cost. There emerges a constitutive tension or “ambiva-
lence” (LMA, 484) at the heart of Christianity, owing to which medieval 
Christianity, culminating in nominalism, will ultimately fall apart: a ten-
sion between investment in the world and investment in salvation, or the 
end of the world.
Despite the tendency towards investment in the world, the work of 
redemption still remains, in the Christian epoch, fundamentally not the 
work of the human subject. As Blumenberg points out, within the medi-
eval Augustinian framework of original sin, the human was considered to 
be responsible for (the condition of) the world. This responsibility was, 
however, defined in a way that resulted in a “renunciation of any attempt 
to change” the world, still less to master it (LMA, 136). The evil of the 
world was due to the original, free human sin, so that, now, the human 
could not by her efforts escape this fallen condition, and only the tran-
scendent grace of God could bring about salvation. Augustine’s ultimate 
motivation was that of justifying the world, contra Gnosticism: he wanted 
to secure the justice and justification of God by introducing human free-
dom in the form of original sin, thus absolving God from the Gnostic 
accusation that he was responsible for evil in creating this wretched cos-
mos (LMA, 133). This Augustinian freedom at once exacerbated the ten-
sion between divine grace and the current state of the world, and tied the 
human to this (fallen) state even further. There was no real work on the 
world that the fallen human could do, no real possibility available. Directed 
towards a future that was fundamentally not-yet, humanity must only 
accept the world and the divine work of redemption.
In Blumenberg’s account, this (first) overcoming of Gnosticism was 
neither permanent nor fully successful. Christianity, one could say, did not 
invest in the world fully enough—precisely because the balance still had to 
remain theologically tipped in favour of divine transcendence and salva-
tion. It is through this gap that Gnosticism persisted as a threat, and the 
tension already present in early Christianity between worldly investment 
and the (more Gnostic) apocalyptic demand continued to exist. With the 
intellectual developments of medieval nominalism, the tension comes to 
the fore and ultimately snaps. For Blumenberg, nominalism—exemplified 
by thinkers like William of Ockham, Nicholas of Autrecourt and Peter 
d’Ailly—indexes a kind of implicit recrudescence of the Gnostic attitude, 
the refusal of investment in or relation to a world that is utterly 
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unfathomable. It is not until the Gnostic tendencies in nominalism are 
overcome that modernity will arrive in the fullness of its legitimacy.
Blumenberg’s treatment of various nominalist thinkers is complex, but 
the fundamental reason for nominalism’s fall into Gnosticism is simple. 
For the nominalist theologians, God’s sovereign power was radically abso-
lute (potentia absoluta) and his will unable to be constrained by any rela-
tion to order, regularity, or law. This “late medieval theological absolutism”, 
with its hypertrophy of “the theological predicates of absolute power and 
freedom”, was therefore “not concerned with the reality of the world and 
its significance for human consciousness but [solely] with preserving the 
full range of God’s possibilities” (LMA, 159). God’s absolute and “unlim-
ited sovereignty” was here identified with the totality of possibility, infinite 
and inexhaustible (potentia is not only power but possibility4). This late- 
medieval God was, in fact, so omnipotent as to become completely alien 
to consciousness. There was no glimpsing into the unfathomable will of 
the divine, no analogy with the human, so transcendent God had become. 
God now had all the possibility to himself, which the human could not 
access. All that remained for the human was to exist in a world that this 
alien God had created, without the prospect, not just of changing it, but 
even of knowing how it worked, as it were, “in itself”. This led ultimately, 
for Blumenberg, to the waning of the importance of divine transcendence, 
which came to be radically separated from the life of the subject in the 
world. As we will see, despite (or rather because of) this separation, the 
contradictions of nominalism’s Gnostic tendencies ultimately generated a 
newly legitimated and autonomous investment in  or “attention to the 
world” (LMA, 505). In insisting on the absoluteness of divine sovereignty, 
nominalism paradoxically paved the way for the sovereignty of the world.
the cOunterWOrld, Or the Birth Of mOdernity Out 
Of nOminalism
Where the previous theological architecture of orthodox Christianity had 
tried to find a balance between the transcendence (and thus sovereignty) 
of God and his purposes for the world, late-medieval nominalism destroyed 
any analogy or even relation between Creator and creation. Consequently, 
4 “The concept of potentia absoluta implies that there is no limit to what is possible … [T]o 
the potentia absoluta [of God] there corresponded an infinity of possible worlds” (LMA, 
153, 160).
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human knowledge of reality was radically put in question. Since God could 
do whatever he willed, and this will was unfathomable to the human mind, 
God’s will—and thus the world—became absolutely contingent.5 There 
was, in this framework, no sufficient reason to be established for the 
world’s workings, and no certainty about them. Since God’s will was abso-
lutely alien and contingent, and thus God’s reasons for creating the world 
and the way the world functioned in itself, reality too was perceived as 
contingent and as alienated from the human mind and its existential con-
cerns. The nominalist “intensification of transcendence” was accompanied 
by a “resignation with respect to immanence”, i.e., in Blumenberg’s terms, 
to the world (LMA, 486). The situation out of which modernity origi-
nated is marked for Blumenberg by a fundamental uncertainty about real-
ity and an “intense consciousness of insecurity” (LMA, 163). The 
guarantee of reality was disappearing from view and from under one’s feet: 
as created by the alien God, the world itself became alien, contingent, 
“groundless” (LMA, 163).
This absolute alienation of God from the world resulted in a general 
“Telosschwund”, a disappearance of any identifiable purpose inherent in 
the world (LMA, 206), and a concomitant loss of what Blumenberg calls 
the “human relevance” of the credibility of transcendence and salvation 
(LMA, 137). According to Blumenberg’s story, as we have seen, this 
hypertrophy of the transcendence of the nominalist God, even to the 
point of “hiddenness”, harboured a return of the Gnostic tendency: “The 
Gnosticism that had not been overcome but only transposed returns [in 
nominalism] in the form of the ‘hidden God’ and His inconceivable abso-
lute sovereignty” (LMA, 135). There was thus here a convergence of sov-
ereignty, transcendence and possibility, all located in the will of the hidden 
God. At the same time, on the other side of this divide or from the point 
of view of human finitude, there was another convergence: that of alien-
ation and contingency, also bound to the absolute divine will—but trans-
posed onto the world. As a result, to the hidden God, there corresponded 
the hidden world, appearing as alienated and absolutely contingent.
Accordingly, the second overcoming of Gnosticism had to overcome 
this alien God and the alienation from the world-in-itself that it entailed. 
To that purpose, nominalist thinkers gradually set the stage, in opposition 
to the fundamentally unknowable divine reality, for what Blumenberg 
5 As Blumenberg claims, only after nominalism could “the world’s form [be conceived] as 
contingent” (LMA, 156).
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terms the counterworld—the world as it appears to the human and as the 
human can navigate and deal with it: “Deprived by God’s hiddenness of 
metaphysical guarantees for the world, man constructs for himself a coun-
terworld of elementary rationality and manipulability” (LMA, 173). 
Contingency is, after all, a kind of possibility, too. What is contingent—
what could be otherwise—can also be seen as manipulable, as long as this 
contingency can be understood as subject to some sort of “elementary 
rationality”. This rationality may not correspond to God’s real (unfathom-
able) will and the world’s real (unfathomable) workings, but as long as 
some sort of rationality to the world’s contingency can be established, the 
human should be able to get by in this world.
This shift towards altering the world (by transforming it into a manipu-
lable counterworld) initially appears for Blumenberg not as a drive to mas-
tery, but simply as a minimal “self-defense”, essentially the last resort 
against the disorder of existential and metaphysical insecurity (LMA, 
191)—a crucial motif in Blumenbergian anthropology, which he tends to 
transpose onto the logic of the history of ideas: desire for order and con-
trol, for rationality and manipulability, as springing from the more mini-
mal need for security and defence. This mechanism is generally, for 
Blumenberg, characteristic of human self-assertion, and the construction 
of the counterworld in nominalism serves precisely the purpose of defend-
ing the human against the alienness of God and of reality. A reality that is 
absolutely alien is perceived as threatening, provoking the fundamental 
need for safety vis-à-vis an “indifferent and ruthless” world (LMA, 182). 
As a result, theoretical and practical interest turns, in nominalism, towards 
what is “humanly relevant”—towards an interest not in how God-created 
reality works in itself, but in what the human mind could make of its work-
ings. The human may not possess any real possibility (which belongs to 
God)—but as long as there can be discovered a mechanism of dealing with 
the world’s contingency in a consistent, rational manner, the human will 
possess a guarantee of reality, however limited or phenomenal, that the 
hidden God is incapable of providing. Indeed, modernity will come to 
realize that “a hidden God is pragmatically as good as dead”, with the 
result that the human is released to engage in a “restless taking stock of 
the world” and the possibilities it provides (LMA, 346; translation modi-
fied). The counterworld is being constructed, crucially, in a de facto oppo-
sition to the divine: as a human world divorced from the transcendent 
divine possibility and from transcendent salvation.
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The elementary rationality in which the human mind could place its 
trust despite the metaphysical contingency of reality was, for the nominal-
ists, mathematical. Underlying the new view of the world as manipulable 
are a complex set of philosophical developments that formulate the quan-
tification and measuring of nature. In opposition to the divine totality of 
possibility, the human seeks another kind of possibility, which the counter-
world could claim for itself: possibility qua manipulability, the possibility 
of dealing with and mastering reality. Seeing as the world “no longer pos-
sessed an accessible order” (LMA, 171), effort gets redirected towards 
dealing with what is humanly accessible, manipulable and ultimately pro-
ducible—and mathematics, in contrast to the qualitative Aristotelian phys-
ics, provides the perfect instrument.6 Mathematical quantification is best 
able to deal with contingency because it is, in principle, “useable in any 
possible world” (LMA, 164). Once again, then, we see how the contin-
gency that was a source of alienation becomes a spur, even an instrument, 
of human self-assertion.
This counterworld is not only subject to rationality and manipulability, 
but also, crucially, mastery: “The more indifferent and ruthless nature 
seemed to be with respect to man, the less it could be a matter of indiffer-
ence to him, and the more ruthlessly he had to materialize, for his master-
ing grasp, even what was pregiven to him as nature, that is, to make it 
‘available’ and to subordinate it to himself as the field of his existential 
prospects” (LMA, 182). The “mastering grasp” of the human is presented 
here as a necessary response to the alienated world and an alien God—a 
need to provide the world with some kind of order. Counterintuitively, 
then, mastery arises out of the evacuation of truth or knowledge about 
God’s infinitely sovereign will, his intentions or laws for creation. One 
example here is the way Blumenberg understands the principle of 
Ockham’s razor: instead of “reconstruct[ing] an order given in nature”, it 
“reduce[s] nature forcibly to an order imputed to it by man” (LMA, 154). 
The forcible and ruthless character of man’s production and domination 
of reality’s order is crucial here, and will become fundamental to moder-
nity. The contingency of reality and its concomitant indifference to the 
human, its radical absence of care, is perceived as a threat and so has to be 
countered with violence, aimed at subduing and regularizing the substrate 
of the world.
6 “The ontological replacement of the category of substance by the category of quantity 
had indeed established the ideal of handling all possible problems by calculation” (LMA, 348).
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The materialization of nature is a part of the same development. 
“Reduction of the world to pure materiality”, Blumenberg writes, is “not 
primarily a theoretical proposition … but rather a postulate of reason 
assuring itself of its possibilities in the world – a postulate of self-assertion” 
(LMA, 209, emphasis added; cf. 151). In this, we see the (humanly rele-
vant) idea of possibility gradually migrating from God to the (counter)
world that the human is constructing—the world that is now coming to 
be seen as producible, as “open to man’s rational disposition” and to 
change (LMA, 151). This is the key component of the transition to 
modernity. Blumenberg frames this development essentially as a binary 
choice: the human could produce a counterworld of immanent self- 
assertion to compensate for the “groundlessness of Creation”, or else face 
the Gnostic resignation of an alienated transcendence (LMA, 154)—an 
option that would have been, per Blumenberg, outright unbearable for 
the human. In this way, the sovereign possibility of God begins to give way 
to the possibilities inherent in the world, which the human can take stock 
of, manipulate and master: an increasing investment in the world over and 
against divine transcendence, an investment that Blumenberg legitimates 
as existentially inevitable, thereby legitimating the modern world that it 
produces.
We can thus see a nexus taking shape in nominalism that will become 
autonomous in and as modernity: the nexus of alienation—possibility/
producibility—mastery, associated with the counterworld that the nomi-
nalists construct. According to Blumenberg’s logic, alienation from the 
world and from God leads to the need to re-establish security, order and 
regularity through mastery and self-assertion, with possibility as the cen-
tral crucial node. That is to say, insofar as the world is now grasped, altered, 
mastered and produced, it is done so as a world of possibility, as a “field of 
existential prospects” that the human must both “subordinate” and work 
to actualize. As Blumenberg summarily puts it: “what is no longer found 
ready as reality benefitting man can be interpreted as a possibility open to 
him” (LMA, 211). Possibility relates to and mediates the other terms in 
the nexus by holding out the promise of overcoming alienation through 
the mastery of the contingent reality.
Nominalism, then, sets the stage for modernity, in which the counter-
world, the manipulable field of “this-worldly possibilities”, becomes the 
central focus of human activity (LMA, 151). In this way, the conjunction 
of possibility and self-assertion is formed within nominalism—as is the 
opposition to divine sovereignty, “to which … man was no longer to 
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submit with humble resignation, but which he would rather oppose with 
a new epistemological conception of the possibilities left open to him even 
with this reservation” (LMA, 385). This opposition is, however, still lim-
ited by this reservation. For Blumenberg there is a limit to nominalism, 
marking it as not-yet modern: the primacy of divine transcendence. The 
secret of creation is still removed from the human—as are salvation and 
fulfilment. Nominalism still maintains “the theological decision in favor of 
the transcendent status of such fulfillment”, precluding its “general human 
accessibility” (LMA, 173). In addition, while nominalism denies “that the 
created world could be the equivalent of the creative power actualized in 
it”, it still does not grant this power to the human subject (LMA, 160), 
nor does it identify the world itself with the sovereign totality of possibil-
ity. Possibility still lies fundamentally with God, and the counterworld that 
the human produces is not yet the true reality.
In other words, the theoretical nexus that will become fundamental to 
modernity may be, in nominalism, in the process of formation, but it is 
still secondary, not yet autonomous (or, in Blumenberg’s terms, legiti-
mate), still existing in the quasi-Gnostic shadow of the omnipotent divine 
sovereign. But with the turn to the modern age, transcendence loses cred-
ibility as a “possibility that is held out to man” and a renewed investment 
in the world occurs. A new possibility is now held out to man: possibil-
ity itself.
the sOvereign POsitiOn Of the WOrld
With the emergence of modernity, all possible positions become positions 
in the world (identified with the humanly manipulable counterworld con-
structed under nominalism) and the world itself (and not God) becomes 
the totality of possibility. In our reading of Blumenberg, this move—this 
reoccupation—does not simply happen in modernity, it is modernity, fully 
legitimated. The counterworld becomes the true world: a reality that is at 
once contingent (not defined by a pre-given divine order) and immanently 
producible (by the subject). In his contrast of nominalism and modernity, 
Blumenberg sets up an opposition between, so to speak, alien transcen-
dence and human immanence. For him, this binary is self-evident; there is 
no other option available. The choice between the two is for him clear, as 
well. Faced with the “transcendent uncertainties” of an indecipherable 
God and an alienated reality that precludes all access to fulfilment or to 
existential security, the human invests in what is manipulable and 
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masterable—in the world of and as possibility (LMA, 468). This mediated 
relation of subject and world—the subject-world dyad—itself becomes the 
guarantee of reality: the only reality that is guaranteed to provide the sub-
ject with perfect certainty and security is the one that has been produced 
immanently by the subject. “The world must be regarded as producible if 
it is not certain that man can get by with what is given”—and if what is 
given is itself, at its core, uncertain and unreliable (LMA, 209). Fulfilment 
thereby also becomes a matter of production: the world in which the mod-
ern subject finds itself may be originally alien and contingent, but since 
this contingency is also grasped as possibility, it must be possible to pro-
duce a reality that would be the subject’s own—rational, known, familiar, 
controlled. This means seeing the world as a “potential for human produc-
tion” (LMA, 199), as “a reality to be altered and produced in accordance 
with human purposes” (LMA, 209), a “worldly” reality now fully and 
self-evidently identified with possibility (LMA, 561). To produce is to 
actualize—to move from the current set of positions and possibilities to a 
new, future one: to produce the world is to produce the future.
Blumenberg’s key concept of the self-assertion of the subject, which 
defines the modern epoch, is premised on the subject-world dyad thus 
understood. Modern self-assertion, says Blumenberg, “means an existen-
tial program, according to which man posits his existence in a historical 
situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the reality 
surrounding him and what use he will make of the possibilities that are 
open to him” (LMA, 138). The “historical situation” is contingent—and 
thereby other to the subject, alienated, in the sense of not being originally 
of the subject’s own making. This reality is the situation in which the sub-
ject finds itself; these possibilities are simply out there and the subject has 
no access to their origin, only to making use of them. Alienation from 
reality crucially persists in modernity from nominalism, becoming a con-
stitutive characteristic of the modern age—an alienation from the modern 
world’s own Christian origin, upon the break with which it constitutively 
founds its legitimacy, thereby inscribing this gap into its structure of 
reality.
However, this reality is now also understood as “open”, as ripe with 
possibility that the human must discern and make use of. In other words, 
the starting point of modernity is the promise that the human can “deal 
with reality” all on her own. It is the new “horizon”, that “of the imma-
nent self-assertion of reason through the mastery and alteration of reality” 
(LMA, 137). Modernity begins with reality as “a potentiality open to 
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man’s rational disposition” (LMA, 151), to mastery and to change. 
Accordingly, the paradigmatic modern subject (“man”, or perhaps Man) 
is, in this framework, one who can discern and grasp—make use of, actual-
ize, master—possibility. In this, the alienation-possibility-mastery nexus 
that began in nominalism becomes, in our reading of  Blumenberg’s 
account, fully decoupled from divine transcendence. Modernity names for 
him self-assertion’s becoming immanent and autonomous for the first 
time, its liberation from any tie to a transcendence that would delegitimate 
or restrict the autonomy of self-assertion by placing possibility outside of 
human production and actualization.
But what is the nature of this worldly immanence that Blumenberg 
posits? In producing a counterworld of possibility, the human takes on a 
creative power akin to that of the Gnostic demiurge, that figure consid-
ered by the Gnostics to be the variously bungling or malevolent creator of 
the false material world. Indeed, Blumenberg makes this connection him-
self, writing, for example, of the “demiurgic activity exercised by man 
upon the world”, and the human’s “demiurgic production” (LMA, 205, 
209; cf. 216, 474). However, Blumenberg does not fully explore the con-
ceptual ramifications of his strange recapitulation of the Gnostic frame-
work. For under this framework, the demiurge is not the true sovereign; 
the real sovereign is the alien God, dwelling beyond in transcendence. 
That is, of course, exactly what Blumenberg seeks to avoid: modernity, for 
him, overcomes Gnosticism by collapsing the distinction between the 
true, otherworldly sovereign and the one who produces the world (here: 
the human as the demiurge), by identifying this world with the true reality.
Yet if we tarry with this Gnostic framework, retaining Blumenberg’s 
suggestion that the human takes on a demiurgic role in modernity, who or 
what assumes the role of the true, transcendent sovereign? We claim it is 
the world. The world reoccupies God’s transcendent position as the total-
ity of possibility, so that, consequently, the immanent-transcendent appa-
ratus that was a source of alienation does not disappear, but is instead 
transposed onto and ultimately as the world itself. The following passage, 
while particularly thorny even by Blumenberg’s standards, provides an 
important view into this framework:
From melancholy over the unreachability of what was reserved transcen-
dently for the Deity, there will emerge the determined competition of the 
immanent idea of science, to which the infinity of nature discloses itself as 
the inexhaustible field of theoretical devotion [Zuwendung] and raises itself 
4 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE WORLD: TOWARDS A POLITICAL THEOLOGY… 
96
to the equivalent of the transcendent infinity of the Deity Himself, which, as 
the idea of salvation, has lost its certainty. (LMA, 336; translation modified)
This passage contains in nuce the transition to modernity and the appear-
ance of self-assertion as we see it, beginning with the alienation from tran-
scendence and ending with the human seeking fulfilment (“salvation”) 
through dealing (scientifically) with a supposedly immanent world—“a 
restless taking stock of the world, which can be designated as the motive 
power of the age of science” (LMA, 346). Despite Blumenberg’s mention 
of a “theoretical devotion”, modern theory needs to be understood for 
him as subordinated to the practice of mastering and producing reality 
(e.g. LMA, 208–9). The world as the “field of theoretical devotion” coin-
cides, in “the immanent idea of science”, with the field of the production 
and mastery of reality. The world as the totality of possibility is inexhaust-
ible, as is the subject’s devotion to it—and it is now from the infinite pos-
sibilities inherent in the world that the subject awaits fulfilment.  As 
Blumenberg puts it in his discussion of Giordano Bruno, this foundational 
figure of the new epoch, modernity “reoccupies the position of the sover-
eignty of the divine will with the necessity of the self-transfer of the divine 
into the worldly—and thus with the necessity of the identification of pos-
sibility and reality” (LMA, 561).
Like other thinkers, such as Charles Taylor, who see modernity as a turn 
towards immanence, Blumenberg’s modernity thus takes up the new sci-
entific engagement with the “immanent” world after being detached from 
an unreachable transcendence. The transition out of the Middle Ages is 
framed by Blumenberg as a competition between resigned (“melancholy”) 
alien transcendence, where possibility is reserved for God, and a newly 
self-authorized human immanence that takes up the infinite possibility for 
itself. Yet, contra Blumenberg’s insistence on immanence winning this 
existential competition, transcendence does not disappear when the posi-
tion of the transcendent Deity is reoccupied in modernity, because it is the 
position itself that is transcendent: the sovereign position of the transcen-
dent totality of possibility. The world retains the structure of transcen-
dence “equivalent” to that of the transcendent God, and with it, the 
alienation that transcendence produces. In defending his notion of self- 
assertion as immanent, Blumenberg might respond that the fact that the 
position of the world is transcendent, reoccupying what used to be the 
position of God, does not necessarily entail the transcendence of self- 
assertion itself, for the subject can never have access to possibility in its 
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entirety, finding itself instead, in its self-assertion, immanently “dealing 
with” possibilities in a contingent, limited situation. This is, however, pre-
cisely what needs to be problematized: Blumenberg’s normative idea that 
the modern subject “merely” orients itself in a particular situation, with-
out recourse to a position or structure of transcendence—an idea inherent 
in Blumenberg’s frequent characterization of self-assertion as “minimal” 
or “modest”. In fact, transcendence is inscribed into the logic of modern 
self-assertion as its condition and is produced as its result.
This structural transcendence, and its concomitant alienation, has sev-
eral interrelated aspects. First, it is precisely because the position of the 
totality of possibility is transcendent that the subject is alienated from the 
contingent reality-as-possibility in the midst of which the subject finds 
itself at the onset of modernity—never possessing this totality as such, but 
merely orienting itself within it, in a constitutive separation from this 
totality and its (hidden) origin. The immanence of self-assertion is pre-
mised on an original gap between the subject, as capable of discerning and 
making use of possibilities, and the world as the field of these possibilities, 
which the subject perceives as something contingent and other than itself. 
The subject discovers itself in a contingent reality that is not of the sub-
ject’s own making, proceeding from which the subject strives to produce 
a reality that would be mastered and under control. Furthermore, until 
the future comes in which the subject will have produced a reality that is 
fully its own, this gap will persist. This structures the subject’s immanent 
self-assertion as a striving and a gap, directing it towards a future that is 
producible but also, fundamentally, not here yet.
This future—the end goal of overcoming alienation and producing a 
fully mastered reality by actualizing possibilities to the fullest, which reoc-
cupies the telos of salvation—is what modern self-assertion orients itself 
towards. As long as reality remains alienated, and not fully produced and 
controllable by the human, this telos persists as transcendent and alienated 
from the subject: the work of actualizing the possibilities inherent in the 
world is constitutively endless. Possibility is by definition something that 
is yet to become actual, or to be discarded in favour of actualizing an alter-
native possibility. Either way, possibility is inherently not-yet actualized. 
This is overwhelmingly so in the case of the process of actualization that is 
supposed to produce the world in its entirety—to exhaust the possibility 
whose inexhaustibility is inscribed into the very character of reality as con-
tingent, and thus as always containing within itself a further set of possi-
bilities. In this way, the full exhaustion of possibility cannot but transcend 
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(the very logic of) possibility. Blumenberg speaks, in this regard, of “self- 
assertion’s unending task” (LMA, 215). Even though “the mastery and 
alteration of reality” is the goal towards which self-assertion is directed, 
self-assertion remains immanent for Blumenberg insofar as it remains 
modest—that is, insofar as it does not make the leap to the transcendent 
future of a fully mastered reality, but deals rather, progressively and in 
small measurable steps, with the possibilities that serve immediate human 
needs in a given historical situation at a given moment. In this, such a 
future remains merely a regulative ideal, without falling into what 
Blumenberg criticizes as “overextensions” of self-assertion’s “authentic” 
immanent and modest character (LMA, 49; cf. 89). Such an ideal, how-
ever, remains constitutively transcendent, so that a double gap emerges: 
the original separation of the subject from the reality alienated from it, 
coupled with the subject’s constitutive separation from the goal of over-
coming this alienation.
One may observe that at both ends of this gap, we find precisely the 
world as the totality of possibility—as the transcendent position from 
which the subject is alienated and which it strives to actualize—so that the 
subject and its striving exist as this gap between past and future, this tear 
in the world, through which the world does not merely remain static but 
reproduces its not-yet—or rather, through which the world remains at 
once in place (in its unreachable transcendent position) and constitutively 
not-yet. The not-yet is thereby perpetuated and transcendence redoubled. 
Traditional salvation of the soul may have, towards the end of the Middle 
Ages, become uncertain, but in modernity it has been replaced by a desire 
for actualization in a deferred future that is always “not yet”—a horizontal 
and temporal transcendence that constitutes self-assertion’s efforts. It is as 
and through this immanent-transcendent apparatus that the transcendent 
position of the world reproduces itself.
This work on the world constitutively transcends any individual subject, 
too, ultimately creating alienation from the process of self-assertion itself, 
precisely as (in Blumenbergian terms) modest, that is, as one that is end-
less and is not supposed to reach the fully actualized future. The problem 
with the alien, transcendent divine sovereign of nominalism was that he 
did not care for the subject—but does the modern world care? If the pros-
pect of divine salvation ultimately lost relevance for consciousness because 
it became too alien, then why would the endless not-yet of the world fare 
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better?7 After all, it takes unending, infinite time to actualize the possibili-
ties inherent in reality, across subjects and across generations (LMA, 155; 
cf. 571). It takes immense energy and never-ending work to actualize it, 
too. All that for the sake of a future that is always possible but never now, 
so that the subject must continue to strive for it, doing “work in his par-
ticular situation for a future whose enjoyment he cannot inherit” (LMA, 
35)—ultimately, for the sake of the (re-)production of the world. The 
modern subject may strive for fulfilment, but all it gets is more work, the 
immanence of self-assertion leading to the imperative of this work (of the 
world) as self-legitimating, self-perpetuating and order-upholding.
Both Christianity and modernity thus, in Blumenberg’s account, over-
come Gnosticism by investing in the (not-yet of the) world8—but only in 
modernity does this investment become total, so that there is nowhere to 
escape from the world: the position of transcendence, too, is occupied by 
it, as is the position of the end goal of all striving. This produces the neces-
sity (the desire) that the world, this world, keep going—at any cost. 
Thereby, the modern world becomes what Blumenberg calls “the work-
place of human exertion”—the “price”, as he puts it, of modern freedom 
(LMA, 200). It is this imperative of work and production that lies for 
Blumenberg at the basis of the modern process of technicization, in turn 
leading to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century industrialization (LMA, 
225), and to the divisions and dominations that industrialization pro-
duced or strengthened. The regulative ideal (of the immanent and modest 
character of self-assertion) that alone was supposed for Blumenberg to 
“make history humanly bearable” by “mak[ing] every absolute claim 
untenable” (LMA, 35) itself lays absolute claim to the subject, binding it 
to the imperative of the production of reality and the movement of 
7 Bringing this logic up to the present, Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011) registers an estrangement from the very process of self-assertion 
under contemporary capitalism, as structured by the promise or the possibility of producing 
a non-alienated existence: “the attrition of a fantasy, a collectively invested form of life, the 
good life”. “[A]s the blueprint has faded”, Berlant writes, this fantasy “has become more 
fantasmatic, with less and less relation to how people can live” (ibid., 11), increasingly losing, 
as Blumenberg would say, relevance for consciousness.
8 The point is not to say that the modern not-yet is a mere “secularization” of the Christian 
not-yet—but to see at once the origin of the former in and its specificity vis-à-vis the latter—
and to see in both a (genealogically connected) apparatus of transcendent futurity and indefi-
nite deferral.
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actualization, the fulfilment of which is always deferred into a transcen-
dent future.
Again, it is precisely the activity of self-assertion that defines modern 
subjectivity in the first place. If we think of the world as the regime of real-
ity that endlessly reproduces and justifies itself through a distribution of 
possibility and actuality, and where the subject is the locus it reproduces 
itself through, then we could say that it is the world, and not the subject, 
that in modernity becomes sovereign. Modern subjectivity reveals subjec-
tion as its flip side: defined in its supposed self-assertion via the work on 
the totality of possibility that is the world, the modern subject becomes 
subject to the world. And if one is not subject to the world, then one is not 
a subject at all.
Crucially, this modern logic of subjectivation also produces, and legiti-
mates, various specific (transcendent) forms of subjection, domination, 
exploitation and exclusion. If, in modernity, possibility becomes identified 
with the world, that means that possibility gets distributed, too, across dif-
ferent situations (and sites) in which subjects find themselves—geographi-
cally or across the globe, too. The idea of the distribution of and access to 
possibility remains unthought by Blumenberg, and yet the stakes here are 
considerable. Such an analytic provides a perspective on how the “work-
place” that is the modern capitalist world becomes an overarching struc-
ture of domination—as well as on the logic of racialization. After all, where 
possibility is both telos and resource, to be competed for and over, access 
to it becomes unequal. Some get (or start) ahead in the race to accumulate 
and actualize it, others get left behind; still others do not have access to 
possibility at all. To master possibility, to get ahead in this race, is to occupy 
a position of power—over the external world, over other subjects and over 
those who, within this framework, are not considered subjects, as in the 
case of the enslaved. As Sylvia Wynter observes, employing Blumenberg’s 
concept of reoccupation: in the modern world, Blackness was “made to 
reoccupy the signifying place of medieval/Latin-Christian Europe’s fallen, 
degraded, and thereby nonmoving Earth” (emphasis added).9 Blackness 
here is, one could say, that which does not take part in modernity’s move-
ment of actualizing possibility—that which has no (and can have no) 
9 Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards 
the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation – An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial 
Review, 3 (3), 2003, 319.
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possibility.10 This exclusion of Blackness is thus constitutive of how the 
very categories of “impossibility and possibility in the form of a historial 
limit [are] produced as existence”, as Nahum Chandler writes.11 Such is, 
for example, the (non-)place of Africa in Hegel’s philosophy of history, as 
what precedes the movement of actualization (of freedom) and cannot 
participate in it. Another German Idealist thinker, Schelling, explicitly 
configures racialization as the consequence of regarding the world as the 
totality of possibility and world-history as the process of actualizing it—so 
that those remaining at the lower stage (Stufe) of this movement are sup-
posed to serve as mere possibility for the higher. The lower is, in fact, 
destined for Schelling to die out naturally upon coming into contact with 
the higher (as in the case of “the American natives”)—or to be put to use 
by the higher, as in the transportation of enslaved Africans to the New 
World, thereby saving the lower from world-historical abandonment and 
giving it the possibility to become part of something higher12—to become 
part of the movement of possibility itself. Death and slavery index the zero 
degree of the logic of possibility, and division through possibility, by way 
of which the modern world functions.
The earth itself cannot escape the world either. The modern conception 
of the world as a totality of possibility that must be worked on sets the 
stage for engaging nature as an exploitable, transformable resource, with 
self-assertion taking a “restless inventory” of the world’s possibilities 
(Weltinventor) and setting a programme for the “domination of nature” 
that Blumenberg sees as uniquely modern (LMA, 346; 182). With devas-
tating ecological consequences, the nonhuman world comes to be seen as 
an “inexhaustible source of material”, full of possibilities that must be 
explored, expanded and exploited by self-assertion, from the depths of the 
earth up into the starry sky, and even the realm of the invisible (LMA, 
474; 369).13 This development is particularly connected with the natural 
philosophy of Francis Bacon, who considered his thought historically 
10 On Blackness as a “void of historical temporality”, see Frank B. Wilderson III, Red, 
White & Black (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 38.
11 Nahum Chandler, X – The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2014), 153.
12 F.W.J.  Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, Bd. II/1 (Stuttgart-Augsburg: Cotta, 1856), 
509, 513–5.
13 Cf. LMA, 363: “the space in which the epoch pursues its curiosity about the world has 
its dimensions, its expanding width, height, and depth.” In other words, the totality of pos-
sibility identified with the world gets distributed along all three dimensions.
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“due”, given that it coincided with what Blumenberg calls “the opening 
of the world by seafaring and trade” (LMA, 388).14 In a sense, Bacon was 
correct, as long as one recognizes that Blumenberg’s “opening of the 
world” implies the opening up of the possibility of discovery and con-
quest, meaning the brutal European colonization of the New World, and 
as long as one understands the truth of “trade” as a nascent global capital-
ism propelled by the slave trade. The historical convergence of this view of 
nature as a field of possibility—“the inexhaustible field of theoretical devo-
tion”—and the fact of Western global capitalist domination, extraction, 
colonization, racialization and enslavement that forms and is formed (and 
justified) by a conceptuality like Bacon’s is far from a coincidence. That is 
to say, the view of nature or the earth as a resource of possibilities to actu-
alize occurs intimately alongside the conversion of other groups of humans 
into a resource, humans who, while closed to possibility or constitutively 
lagging behind, become themselves a resource for work and actualiza-
tion.15 The modern world is, one could say, the earth converted to 
possibility.
The world as the totality of possibility thus reveals itself to be a distribu-
tion of power and hierarchical order. This is also where the sovereignty of 
the world, and the logic of modern “immanent” self-assertion, con-
verges—despite Blumenberg’s explicit opposition to Schmitt—with the 
Schmittian-Hobbesian (transcendent) sovereignty. Precisely because 
Blumenberg tends to avoid thematizing self-assertion in relation to sover-
eignty, the rare instance where he does is all the more telling. The subject’s 
transfer of right to the absolute sovereign ruler in the Hobbesian contract 
is, for Blumenberg, not a secularization of God’s sovereignty (as in 
Schmitt), but an exemplary instance of the self-assertion of reason (LMA, 
219). In Hobbes, we might recall, the state of nature is configured as 
absolutely contingent and lawless, an alien, dysfunctional chaos, in which 
every subject is an absolute sovereign unto itself, and therefore no sover-
eignty and no rule actually exist; hence the necessity of transitioning to a 
civil state—of instituting, and upholding, the political world. In 
14 Cf. LMA, 389: “The image of the contemporary voyages of discovery dominates Bacon’s 
thought.”
15 On enslavement as geo-racial “resource” in and of modernity, see Kathryn Yusoff, A 
Billion Black Anthropocenes or None (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018). On 
the colonized and women’s bodies and labour becoming “natural resources” beginning in 
early-modern capitalism, see Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and 
Primitive Accumulation (New York: Autonomedia, 2004).
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Blumenberg, this is analogized to the general “demiurgic” creation, in 
early modernity, of the world as the site of rational self-assertion. Just as 
early scientific modernity emerged through self-assertion seizing the alien-
ated cosmos of nominalism as a field of possibilities, in the political realm 
it is the alienated “chaos of absolute rights [in the posited state of nature]… 
that enables [reason] to grasp the opportunity of self-assertion … by trans-
ferring the many absolute rights to one absolute right – that of the ruler” 
(LMA, 219). In each case, this gesture indexes self-assertion’s need for 
order and justification, no matter “the doubtfulness of the achieved and 
justified order and of the resulting concept of order”, for “‘any order at 
all’ [is better than none]” (LMA, 219). This existential need for order is 
put forth and produced over against the chaos, disorder and alienation of 
the pre-political state of nature, likened by Hobbes to the chaos of matter, 
with its “constructive potentiality” (LMA, 220). Thereby, the political 
world becomes producible in a way comparable to the material world. If 
the Hobbesian state of nature maps, per Blumenberg, onto the late- 
nominalist state of alienation (LMA, 218), then the overcoming of that 
state coincides structurally with the overcoming of nominalism and 
Gnosticism, and thus with the condition of modern self-assertion as such.
In other words, this logic of sovereignty—which for Blumenberg 
extends beyond Hobbes to other regimes of modern governance like lib-
eralism (LMA, 220)—exemplifies, in the political sphere, the general 
modern logic of subjection and world-investment. Political order needs to 
be instituted as part of the overall world-order, its producibility and its 
regularity, so as to make possible the work on and of the world. Self- 
assertion structurally needs a sovereign because it needs order, or the 
guarantee of reality. If the subject were really to assert itself, without limit, 
in this contingent, alienated world in which the subject finds itself at the 
outset of modernity, this would lead, as in the Hobbesian state of nature, 
to “the unlimitedness and unlimitability of [the subject’s] claim to every-
thing at all” and to “perfect chaos” (LMA, 218–9). This serves to show, 
yet again, that Blumenbergian self-assertion carries with it the require-
ment of a transcendent order, political and ontological, so it can function 
as an investment in (and justification of) the world and is not directed 
against it. The limited, “modest” character of modern self-assertion on 
which Blumenberg so emphatically insists thereby reveals subjection and 
(transcendent) order as its necessary conditions. The claim to power—“to 
everything at all that [the subject] finds within his reach”—of course 
remains within this order, too, but channelled into the work of 
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maintaining the world instead of disrupting it. In this way, it becomes the 
modern claim to the possibility of mastery and domination of reality. 
Subjective self-assertion and political sovereignty, Blumenberg and 
Schmitt, function together to uphold the stability of this order and this 
position.16
cOnclusiOn: life against the WOrld
The fear of the absence, refusal or unjustifiability of the world is shared by 
Blumenberg and Schmitt. The imperative that the world must be is, of 
course, just as central for the Christian overcoming of apocalypticism and 
Gnosticism as it is for modern investment in the world (Gnosticism’s sec-
ond overcoming). For if there is no world, or if it has no legitimacy, then 
the entire logic of self-assertion falls apart, and the ground and telos of the 
subject’s striving dissolve into air. If, however, this world that Christianity 
and modernity have jointly produced—this world that is violent, contin-
gent, exhausting—is to be delegitimated, then it might be worthwhile to 
dwell on the transitory moment of alienation and disorder, grasped by 
Hobbes and Blumenberg alike as the condition that they seek to foreclose. 
Thinking alienation and disorder as decoupled from the supposed necessity 
of the (Christian-modern) world elicits what would need to be affirmed 
against the logics of transcendence that set the subject endlessly to work 
and to reproduce the world—and what needs to be refused so as not to fall 
back into these logics.
What needs to be refused in the first place is the all-too-often implied 
inevitability of the modern world and the modern structure of reality, even 
in those accounts that are otherwise critical of the Christian-modern. 
Despite his sense for historical contingency, Blumenberg, too, is keen to 
affirm the necessity of the modern world bordering on the teleological—
no wonder that modernity is considered by him to be the decisive over-
coming of Gnosticism, inevitably finishing the task that remained 
unfinished in Christianity. Modern self-assertion, for Blumenberg, was the 
“only possibility left to man”, the only alternative in the face of the alien-
ation that the Gnostic tendency represents (LMA, 191; cf. 468)—the 
alternative of what Blumenberg sees as immanence against the alienation 
16 On how Schmittian sovereignty serves to uphold the order of the world, see Daniel 
Colucciello Barber, “This, Now-Here, No-Where,” in Chepurin and Dubilet, Nothing 
Absolute.
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of transcendence. In the choice set up between alienated transcendence 
and the immanence of self-assertion, it is only the latter that could, for 
Blumenberg, provide the guarantee of reality, the order and security of 
world-production and world-investment. The Gnostic imperative of “the 
downfall of the world”, inhabiting what is absolutely alien vis-à-vis the 
world, appears unbearable or “intolerable” to Blumenberg (LMA, 131)—
an “obsessional neurosis” that places the world “under the embargo of 
impossibility” (LMA, 67–8), in response to which the human must take 
up the demiurgic role and invest in the world.17
However, is it not the modern world itself that becomes unbearable, 
exclusionary and precarious—an endless workplace, whose burdens we are 
never done bearing? What if, therefore, the binary that Blumenberg 
advances at the origin of modernity is a false one? In the binary between 
the impossible and the possible, the threatening and the secure, the choice 
for order, which Blumenberg absolutizes, was, after all, the choice for a 
specific kind of order produced by, in and as modernity—an order born 
out of the exclusion and exploitation of forms of being deemed too disor-
derly or too different. What if one could rather think an affirmation or 
inhabitation of the disorderly and the impossible, or that which, vis-à-vis 
the modern world, has no possibility? What if the alien could function not 
as an alien transcendence, but what Fred Moten has termed an “alien 
immanence”18? This would involve, to reclaim Blumenberg’s dismissive 
phrase, a life against the world,19 a choice to inhabit immanently the down-
fall of the world against its order and its apparatus of exclusion and subjec-
tion. Hobbes and Blumenberg think of disorder and chaos as a 
hyper-individualistic, brutal state (a conception that is itself part of moder-
nity’s narrative), so as to pit the perceived evils of such a state theodically 
against the good of the world-order.20 However, could the choice for 
17 Fourteen years before Blumenberg’s Legitimacy, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks 
(New York: Grove Press, 2008 [1952]) employed the same Freudian concept of “obsessional 
neurosis” to describe the (non)position of Blackness in the world (42). This common 
Gnostic refusal of the world-order seen as neurosis must be thought alongside Fanon’s later 
call, in The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004 [1961]), for “an agenda for 
total disorder” (2). We acknowledge here Anthony Paul Smith’s ongoing work around this 
question in Fanon. 
18 Fred Moten, Black and Blur (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 63.
19 “The world … demanded a decision between trust and mistrust, an arrangement of life 
with the world rather than against it” (LMA, 131).
20 On Blumenberg’s project as a theodicy, see Willem Styfhals, No Spiritual Investment in 
the World: Gnosticism and Postwar German Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).
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disorder be instead a choice made from within the (under)commons of 
afflicted life, a choice already made by the multitudes of those dispropor-
tionately subjected and alienated so as to produce the order of the modern 
world? To think the unbearability of the world that sets subjects endlessly 
to work—though always differentially and unequally—is to refuse the 
transcendence instituted by and as the modern world, to refuse to con-
vert alienation into possibility and mastery, and to dwell with an imma-
nence that is alien to the world of possibility, that precisely does embargo 
the world in the name of the impossible and demands its downfall.
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